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a b s t r a c t 
In this paper, we examine the impact of manufacturers upgrading strategy of durable products on the de- 
cision of third-party entrant in a secondary market. To do so, we develop a two-period model in which a 
monopolistic manufacturer sells new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while a 
third-party entrant operates a reverse channel selling used products in the secondary market. The manu- 
facturer releases an upgraded product (i.e., one that is technologically superior to the version introduced 
in the ﬁrst period). We derive conditions under which it is optimal (1) for the manufacture to release an 
upgraded product in the second period and (2) for a third party entrant to enter a secondary market. We 
also ﬁnd, through numerical analysis, that when upgrades are typically small or moderate, the upgrading 
of new products can increase a third party entrant’s proﬁtability in the secondary market but it does not 
beneﬁt the third party entrant when upgrades are typically large. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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0. Introduction 
Upgrading is the process of replacing a product with a new
igher quality version of the same product (e.g., one with a
tronger function or higher performance, Anton & Biglaiser, 2013;
udenberg & Tirole, 1998; Martin, 2011 ). Frequent introduction of
pgraded products has been recognized as an important means by
hich ﬁrms continuously renew themselves in order to survive
nd prosper in a rapidly changing business environment ( Anton
 Biglaiser, 2013; Koufteros & Marcoulides, 2006 ) and is particu-
arly noticeable in durable goods industries. For example, a new
obile phone model is introduced into the market with innova-
ive agenda, camera, or Internet functions every month ( Martin,
011 ), while in the automobile industry, car makers introduce new
omponents with every new model yearly. Similar patterns can be
bserved in other industries, including PCs, household appliances
e.g., washing machines, dryers, and vacuum cleaners), CRT devices
e.g., TV sets and monitors), and consumer electronics ( Anton &
iglaiser, 2013 ). At the same time, however, trading used products
n secondary markets is also a common practice in many durable∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: xiongzhongkai@cqu.edu.cn (Z. Xiong). 
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377-2217/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uoods industries ( Hendel & Lizzeri, 1999; Schiraldi & Nava, 2012;
hen & Willems, 2014; Shulman & Coughlan, 2007; Yin, Ray, Gur-
ani, & Animesh, 2010 ), including the used car and second-hand
Cs, etc. As Computer Business Review (2005) 1 points out, these
econdary markets have grown rapidly in recent years with third-
arty companies, for example, the PC industry building$100+ mil-
ion per year businesses in buying, selling, or leasing used com-
uter equipment. 
In this paper, we focus on the effect of product upgrading on
hird party used product retailer’s entrance decision to the sec-
ndary market. Because an upgraded product gives consumers a
igher utility, it will prompt those consumers who were planning
o buy used products in the secondary markets to turn to the
ew products market for higher quality or performance. In this
ase, product upgrading will have a negative effect on the sales of
sed products, which will reduce the entrance propensity of a
hird party retailer. On the other hand, consumers earn a higher
et beneﬁt from replacing a used with an upgraded new prod-
ct, so product upgrading will have a positive effect on the sales
f used products, by ensuring greater availability of used products,1 Computer Business Review (2005). Big Players Emerge in Fragmented Brokerage 
arket. Accessed September 5, http://www.cbronline.com/news/big players emerge 
n fragmented brokerage market. 
nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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u  which obviously increase the entrance propensity. These observa-
tions raise an important question that warrants theoretical anal-
ysis: whether the manufacturer upgrading of new products actu-
ally affects the third party retailer’s entrance decision to secondary
market, and if so, how? 
Yet the models used in previous research tend to ignore the ef-
fect of manufacturer’s upgrading decisions on the secondary mar-
ket and consider only these markets impacts on manufacturer’s
new product introduction strategies (e.g., ( Fudenberg & Tirole,
1998; Yin et al., 2010; Zhao & Jagpal, 2006 ). Hence, in this pa-
per, we focus on the effect of manufacturer’s upgrading of new
products on the sales of used products in the secondary market.
To do so, we develop a dynamic two-period model in which a mo-
nopolistic manufacturer sells new durable products directly to end
consumers in both periods, and a third-party entrant sells used
products (i.e., those marketed in the ﬁrst period) in the second pe-
riod through a secondary market that is not directly controlled by
the manufacturer. Our primary interest is in answering the follow-
ing questions: Under what conditions it is optimal for a durable
goods manufacturer to upgrade new products in the second pe-
riod? What condition is needed for the third-party entrant to
enter the secondary market in the second period? How does man-
ufacturer upgrading degree affect the proﬁts of channel partners?
Hence our model differs from those previous studies in that it
simultaneously considers an active secondary market, upgrading
of new products, consumer market segmentation, and especially,
the upgrade degree of new products as a function of consumer
demand. 
Our analysis reveals that when the investment cost of upgrad-
ing products is low, manufacturers do have an incentive to release
an upgraded version in the second period, but when the invest-
ment cost is higher, they do not. Moreover, although the degree of
upgrade always has a negative effect on the price of new products
in the ﬁrst period, its effect on the price of both used and new
products in the second period is unimodal depending on intensity.
We also ﬁnd that the third-party entrant is likely to engage in the
secondary market when the purchase cost of used products from
former consumers is signiﬁcantly low. Most importantly, we show
that the upgrading of new products can increase the third-party
entrants secondary market proﬁtability when upgrades are typi-
cally minor or moderate but selling used products in the secondary
market does not beneﬁt the third-party entrant when upgrades are
typically major. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related literature and explains our contributions in more detail.
Section 3 outlines the key elements of our model, as well as the
derivation of the consumer demand function. Section 4 describes
the model framework, presents the optimal equilibrium solutions
for channel partners, and reports our main ﬁndings. Section 5
summarizes our conclusions and suggests opportunities for future
research. 
2. Relevant literature 
Our paper is closely related to the broader literature on durable
goods and new product development strategies; particularly, those
studies that address (1) the dynamics between new and used prod-
ucts and (2) the interaction between the secondary market and the
introduction of upgrades in the durable goods industry. The ﬁrst
stream of research, which is especially well established, includes
( Fudenberg & Tirole, 1998; Levinthal & Purohit, 1989; Shulman &
Coughlan, 2007 ). Levinthal and Purohit (1989) examine the optimal
sales strategy for a monopolist marketing a durable product in an
existing secondary market. They show that not only limiting initial
sales lowers new product cannibalization but buying back the ear-
lier version generates greater demand for the new product. Theirodel, however, assuming that prices are linear functions of the
umulative quantities produced to date, does not allow nonbuyers
rom the ﬁrst period to purchase in the second period. Fudenberg
nd Tirole (1998) , in their analysis of ﬁrms dynamic pricing strate-
ies in an existing secondary market, assumes that consumers in
he market are homogeneous and the used market generates no
roﬁts for channel members. Based on heterogeneous consumers,
hulman and Coughlan (2007) show that the manufacturer earns
igher proﬁts from allowing used-good sales alongside new-good
ales than from shutting down a retailer-proﬁtable secondary mar-
et that expands the manufacturers unit sales beyond what is pos-
ible when only the primary market exists. These studies, however,
gnore the effect of the new products upgrade on channel part-
ers strategies. For further discussion of the relevant issues, see
haskaran and Gilbert (2005) ; Chen, Esteban, and Shum (2010) ;
esai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit (2004) ; Desai and Purohit (1998,
999) ; Huang, Yang, and Anderson (2001) ; Pangburn and Stavru-
aki (2014) ; Xiong, Yan, Fernandes, Xiong, and Guo (2012) ; Xiong,
hou, Li, Chan, and Xiong (2013) . 
Our study is also related to the literature on the interaction be-
ween the secondary market and the introduction of upgrades in
urable goods market. Zhao and Jagpal (2006) , for instance, ex-
mine the effect of secondary markets for durable goods on a
rm’s dynamic pricing and new product introduction strategies.
hey ﬁnd that secondary markets have differentiating effects on
ricing across industries depending on the magnitudes of the inno-
ation (major, moderate, or minor), and whether demand external-
ties are present. Martin (2011) then examines strategic behavior in
 durable goods oligopoly where there is a positive probability of
pgrade introduction. He argues that the presence of a secondary
arket not only increases the range of upgrades that are proﬁtable
ut also raises proﬁtability for a given upgrade quantity because
ormer customers can be charged a higher price for the upgrade.
oth studies, however, assume that used products are sold in an
solated channel while in reality, retailers sell used goods for proﬁt
n a co-opetition environment, for example, in textbook markets
sed book sellers not only cooperate with the manufacturers but
re in competition with them. The presence of secondary market,
herefore, especially one that is not directly controlled by the new
roduct manufacturer, forces new product retailers or manufac-
urers to take used goods consumers into account when making
usiness decisions. On the other hand, Yin et al. (2010) , in their
nalysis of how the sequential emergence of retailer and P2P used
oods markets shape both a manufacturers product upgrade strat-
gy and a primary market retailers pricing strategy, assume that
he retailer sells both used and new products for proﬁt simulta-
eously. They ﬁnd that frequent product upgrades and rising retail
rices in durable product sectors results from the emergence of
 P2P used goods market whose interaction with the retail used
oods source alters the relative powers of the channel partners.
n reaching this conclusion, however, they assume an exogenous
egmentation of consumers who return used goods to the retail
tore or exchange them in P2P markets. For additional insights on
his topic, see Esteban and Shum (2007) ; Fishman and Rob (20 0 0) ;
ogan (2011) ; Kornish (2001) ; Lim and Tang (2006) ; Oraiopoulos,
erguson, and Toktay (2012) . 
Our paper differs from the extant literature in two ways: First,
nstead of ignoring the new product upgrade degree and paying
ittle attention to its impact on consumer segmentation (particu-
arly, consumer utilities), we endogenize this degree as a function
f consumer demand (i.e., an endogenous segmentation of con-
umers). Second, rather than assuming that used goods are not
old through, or are sold outside, the standard channel, which
gnores the effect of upgraded new product introduction in the
econdary market, our dynamic model assumes that used prod-
cts are sold by a third-party entrant in a secondary market not
Y. Xiong et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 252 (2016) 443–454 445 
Fig. 1. Two-period model framework. 
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4 We label the new product in the ﬁrst period the “original version”. irectly controlled by the manufacturer. In particular, we focus on
he effect of manufacturer’s product upgrading on the third-party
ntrant’s decisions within a two-period context. To do so, we make
wo assumptions: First, we assume that consumers’ quality valua-
ions are heterogeneous, so that used product markets can be ex-
licitly modeled. Second, to provide useful insights on third-party
ntrance into a secondary market, we assume the existence of an
ctive secondary market that is not controlled by the manufacturer.
Although a few models have been developed to investigate the
xistence of new and used products of the same version in dy-
amic settings (e.g., Erzurumlu (2010) ; Ferrer and Swaminathan
20 06) ; Huang et al. (20 01) , they do not capture the manufactur-
rs upgrading strategies. Their focuses are either the competition
etween new and used products of the same version or how a
rictionless used goods market affects the price of new products.
n contrast, we consider the competition between new and used
roducts of different versions and examine the effect of the man-
facturers product upgrading on the decisions of third-party en-
rants in the secondary market. Our analytic results show that the
pgrading degree of new products is critical to the proﬁts of the
hannel members. 
. Model framework 
In developing our framework, we consider a two-period model 2 
n which a monopolistic manufacturer (M) sells new durable prod-
cts directly to end consumers in both periods, while a third-party
ntrant (TPE) sells reverse channeled used products (i.e., cleaned
nd tested buybacks from former customers) in a secondary mar-
et not directly controlled by the manufacturer (see Fig. 1 ). We as-
ume that all products provide only two periods of service (see,
esai et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2010 ): “new” in period 1 and “used”
n period 2. As a result, only new products are available in pe-
iod 1, but both new and used products are available in period 2,
hich means the manufacturer’s new product sales face competi-
ion from the used products offered by the TPE. 3 
Following ( Desai et al., 2004 ) and ( Shulman & Coughlan, 2007 ),
e assume that all players in the model are rational and follow a
tackelberg game (see Fig. 2 ). In stage 1, period 1, the manufacturer2 This assumption is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Desai et al., 2004; 
esai & Purohit, 1998; Xiong et al., 2012 ), and a two-period model not only allows 
s to study dynamic issues while retaining tractability but simpliﬁes the presenta- 
ion of our analysis. 
3 In reporting our analytic results, for convenience, we use the pronouns “he” and 
she” to refer to the manufacturer and third-party entrant, respectively. 
t
a
d
i
Y
decides whether or not to introduce an upgraded version 4 of the
roduct in period 2, since upgrade decision is normally strategic
nd require signiﬁcant lead time. 5 If an upgrade is introduced, it
ncreases customer valuations of the new product in period 2 by a
actor of 1 + α, where α (the product upgrade degree) is greater
han zero. 6 Such a decision, however, involves an investment by
he manufacturer whose amount depends on the upgrade degree. 
Then, the manufacturer determines the unit price of the ﬁrst-
eriod new products p 1 in stage 2, period 1, and the unit price of
he second-period new products 7 p 2 in stage 1, period 2. The TPE
hen decides the price of used products p u in stage 2, period 2. 
.1. Product 
To model the difference between new and used products, we
esignate the durability of the products produced in period 1 by
actor δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), which represents how well a unit sold in pe-
iod 1 holds up in period 2 (when it is classiﬁed as used). If δ = 1 ,
he product is perfectly durable and shows no deterioration over
ime, meaning that in period 2, used units are identical to new
nits. If δ = 0 , the product is nondurable and deteriorates fully af-
er one period of use. In this paper, we consider only 0 < δ < 1. 
.2. Manufacturer 
The manufacturer’s problem is to set upgrade degree and price
 i so as to maximize his proﬁts. Here, i = 1 , 2 denotes period 1 or
. If the manufacturer introduces an upgraded product in period 2,
e denote it as α > 0; otherwise α = 0 (i.e., the manufacturer sells
he original product in period 2). We further assume that if an up-
raded version is introduced, it requires an investment cost for the
anufacturer, the amount of which depends on the upgrade de-
ree. Without loss of generality, we normalize the manufacturer’s
arginal cost of production and selling to zero. 
.3. Third-party entrant 
The TPE’s problem is to choose the price of used products p u 
n a way that maximizes her proﬁts. Suppose that used products
ave a residual value for all customers, the TPE occurs a reverse
ost c from buying back used products for proﬁtable resale. We
lso normalize the TPE’s marginal cost of reselling to zero without
oss of generality. 
.4. Consumer strategies 
We ﬁrst assume that the size of the consumer population does
ot change over time and can be normalized to 1 and that no con-
umer can use more than one unit of the product in any period.
e can then derive the inverse demand functions from the con-
umer utility functions. We do so by modeling heterogeneous con-
umers using parameter θ to represent a consumers valuation of
he services provided by a durable, which is distributed uniformly
n the interval [0, 1]. Consumer with type θ thus has a valuation
f θ for a new product. Recall that the durability of the product is
, which represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up as5 Edition upgrades of college textbooks, for example, often take over a year, and 
he decision to update is made years in advance (e.g., Friscia, 2009; Yin et al., 2010 ). 
6 This factor refers to the degree of quality differentiation between the original 
nd upgraded product versions. For instance, ﬁrms in the computer hardware in- 
ustry continuously introduce technological innovations that lead to improvements 
n, for example, memory and speed. 
7 The version sold depends on the manufacturers decision in the ﬁrst stage. Like 
in et al. (2010) , we assume that original and upgraded versions of the new pro- 
uce are not marketed simultaneously. 
446 Y. Xiong et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 252 (2016) 443–454 
Fig. 2. Sequence of events. (Note: The notations α > 0 and α = 0 , respectively, denote whether or not the manufacturer decides to release an upgraded version in period 
2.). 
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pa used product in period 2, then consumer with type θ has a val-
uation of δθ for one used product. We assume that no consumers
sell their used products directly to each other. 
In period 1, the consumer can either buy a new product or
choose not to. In period 2, consumers who bought a new prod-
uct in period 1 can either replace it with a new version from
the manufacturer or continue using the same product and abstain
from the market at the end of period 2. On the other hand, con-
sumers who did not buy a new product in period 1 can either
buy a new or used unit or remain inactive in period 2. Follow-
ing the same procedure as Desai et al. (2004) ; Desai and Puro-
hit (1998) ; Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) , we can then use a consumer
choice model to derive the consumer demand. 
The consumer type space can be divided into ﬁve segments: (1)
consumers who buy a new product in period 1 and then sell their
used product and buy a new product in period 2 (NN), (2) con-
sumers who buy a new product in period 1 and continue using it
in period 2 (NU), (3) consumers who do not buy in period 1 but
buy a new product in period 2 (ON), (4) consumers who do not
buy in period 1 but buy a used product in period 2 (OU), and (5)
consumers who do not buy in either period (OO). Like Oraiopoulos
et al. (2012) , we assume that α < δ (i.e., 1 + α < 1 + δ); oth-
erwise, the one-period utility from the improved product would
be larger than the combined ﬁrst- and second-period utility de-
rived by the consumer from a ﬁrst-period purchase (in which case,
the ON segment would grow rapidly at the expense of all other
segments). 
Using the above analysis, we derive the total utility for ev-
ery consumer segment: (1) (NN): U NN = θ − p 1 + c + (1 + α) θ −
p 2 ; (2) (NU): U NU = θ − p 1 + δθ ; (3) (ON): U ON = (1 + α) θ − p 2 ;
(4) (OU): U OU = δθ − p u ; and (5) (OO): U OO = 0 . In terms of con-
sumer utility, if all ﬁve strategies are in equilibrium, then each
consumer segment values the product more (i.e., has a higher
θ ) than the next segment, so that NN valuation > NU valua-
tion > ON valuation > OU valuation > OO valuation ( Desai et al.
(2004) . Solving for marginal consumers, U NN = U NU , yields the lo-
cation point θ1 = p 2 −c 1+ α−δ of the consumer who is indifferent be-
tween an NN or NU strategy. we can similarly obtain point θ2 =
p 1 −p 2 
δ−α for the consumer who has the same utility whether adopt-
ing an NU or ON strategy, point θ3 = p 2 −p u 1+ α−δ for the consumer
who has the same utility whether adopting an ON or OU strat-
egy, and pint θ4 = p u δ for the consumer who has the same util-
ity whether adopting an OU or OO strategy. we therefore have
q NN = 1 − θ1 = 1+ α−δ+ c−p 2 1+ α−δ , q NU = θ1 − θ2 = 
p 2 −c 
1+ α−δ −
p 1 −p 2 
δ−α , q ON =
θ2 − θ3 = p 1 −p 2 δ−α −
p 2 −p u 
1+ α−δ , q OU = θ3 − θ4 = 
p 2 −p u 
1+ α−δ −
p u 
δ
, where q NN ,
q NU and q OU denote the size of each consumer segment, respec-
tively. 
Remark 1. 
(1) The second period quantities of new products ( q NN + q ON )
for the manufacturer increase in upgrade degree α, while
the quantities of used products ( q OU ) for the TPE decrease
in upgrade degree α. (2) The second period quantities of new products ( q NN + q ON )
for the manufacturer decrease in product durability δ, while
the quantities of used products ( q OU ) for the TPE increase in
product durability δ. 
(3) The quantities for consumers ( q NN ) who buy new products
in both periods increase in the reverse cost of used prod-
ucts c , while the quantities for consumers ( q NU ) who buy a
new product in period 1 and continue using it in period 2
decrease in the reverse cost of used products c . 
(4) The ﬁrst period quantities of new products ( q NN + q NU ) for
the manufacturer increase with product durability δ. 
It is clear that consumer utility increases with upgrade degree:
he higher the upgrade degree of the new products in period 2,
he greater the number of consumers who purchase a new prod-
ct in period 1, want to sell their used product and buy a new
roduct in period 2, or who do not purchase a new product in
eriod 1, favor to buy a new one in period 2. Thus, the second-
eriod quantities of new products increase in the upgrade degree,
ut used product quantities decrease. This reduction occurs for two
easons: First, as the upgrade degree increases, fewer consumers
urchase a new product in period 1, preferring instead to buy an
pgraded product in period 2. This choice shrinks used product
ales in period 2. Second, from the manufacturer’s point of view,
igher ﬁrst-period sales generate higher ﬁrst-period proﬁts, but
lso result in a greater quantity of used goods to compete with
uture new good sales, thereby he prefers to limit the production
f ﬁrst period products. That is, fewer used products are available.
ence, overall, used products quantities decrease in the upgrade
egree. 
The decrease in second-period quantities of new products as
roduct durability increases also has two explanations: First, as
roduct durability increases, more consumers who purchase a new
roduct in period 1 prefer to continue using that product in pe-
iod 2. This choice shrinks the market of consumers who purchase
 new product in the ﬁrst period and then sell their used product
nd buy a new product in period 2. Second, as product durability
ncreases, fewer consumers who do not purchase a new product in
eriod 1 choose to buy a new product in period 2. Moreover, the
igher the product durability, the higher the utilities and thus the
umber of consumers who purchase no new product in period 1
nd buy a used product in period 2. 
The higher the reverse cost of the used products (i.e., the higher
he residual value of used products for consumers), the greater the
umber of consumers who buy a new product in period 1 and
hen sell their used product and buy a new product in period 2.
his observation implies that fewer consumers who buy a new
roduct in period 1 keep using it in period 2 because the higher
esidual value of the used products increases their utilities. 
Finally, the higher the product durability, the higher the util-
ties of consumers who buy a product in period 1, meaning that
ore consumers who want to keep the product or sell it in the
econdary market at its resale value in period 2 prefer to buy a
ew product in period 1. Hence, the ﬁrst-period quantities of new
roducts increase with the increase of product durability. 
Y. Xiong et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 252 (2016) 443–454 447 
Table 1 
Equlibrium decisions for the channel partners in model. 
TPE’s decison 
p ∗u = δ(1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)]+ cδ[(δ−α)(5 α−2 δ+2)+3(1+ δ)] 2[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+1) −2 δ(δ−α)][2(1+ α)( 1 
δ−α +1) −δ] 
Manufacturer’s decison 
period 1: p ∗1 = (δ−α)[2(1+ α)(2+ c) −δ(δ−α)] 7(1+ α)(δ−α)+(1+ α) −2 δ(δ−α) 
period 2: p ∗2 = (1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)]+ c[(δ−α)(5 α−2 δ+2)+3(1+ δ)] [(δ−α)(7 − 2 δ1+ α )+1][2(1+ α)( 1 δ−α +1) −δ] Threshold value of K 
K ∗(α) = 2[ (p ∗1 | α> 0 ) −(p ∗1 | α=0 )] α(α+2) 
where 
(p ∗1 | α> 0 ) = p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + p 2 (q NN + q ON ) = G (1 − GN(1+ α) H N(δ−α) ) + (1+ α) H 
2 
2 N(1+ α−δ)(α−δ) ;
G = (δ−α)(4+4 α+ αδ+2 cα−δ2 +2 c) 
1+7 δ+9 αδ−7 α2 −2 δ2 −6 α
N = 2 + 2 δ + 3 αδ − 2 α2 − δ2 ; 
H = α2 − G (1 + α + δ) + cα − 2 αδ − δ + δ2 − cδ; 
and, (p ∗1 | α> 0 ) equals to (p ∗1 | α=0 ) , when α = 0 
4
 
u  
s  
c  
t  
b  
s  
m  
W  
k  
a
4
 
b  
e  
c  
m
M
 
w  
u  
c  
p
4
 
t  
T  
o  
t  
t  
l  
s
4
 
e
t
r
M
 
w  
t  
t
4
 
a  
s  
v  
t  
ﬁ
M
w  
t  
m  
r  
i  
m  
r  
A
 
t  
p  
v  
W
P  
d  
m  
d
 
h  
t  
w  
s  
T  
t  . Model development 
As outlined previously, our model includes a monopolistic man-
facturer who sells his new durable products directly to end con-
umers in both periods, while in period 2, a TPE sells reverse
hanneled used products in a secondary market not directly con-
rolled by the manufacturer. We now characterize the equilibrium
etween the players involved with a focus on the following dimen-
ions: Under what conditions it is optimal for the durable goods
anufacturer to release an upgraded version in the second period?
hat condition is needed for the TPE to enter the secondary mar-
et in the second period? How does the upgrading of new products
ffect the proﬁts of the channel partners? 
.1. The TPE’s problem 
To ensure a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we follow a
ackward induction method in which we ﬁrst solve the third-party
ntrant’s optimization problem under the assumption of rational
onsumer expectations. Denoting the TPE’s proﬁt by e , we for-
ulate the TPE’s problem 8 as 
ax p u e (p 1 , p 2 , p u ) = p u q OU − cq NN 
= p u 
(
p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ −
p u 
δ
)
− c 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ
)
s.t., 0 < q OU ≤ q NN (1)
here the constraint q OU ≤ q NN ensures that the sales quantity of
sed products is not greater than the number of units that can be
ollected from consumers and p u and c represent the price of used
roducts and their reverse cost to the TPE, respectively. 
.2. The manufacturer’s problem 
The manufacturer’s problem is to maximize the total proﬁt over
he two periods with respect to p 1 , p 2 , taking into account the
PE’s best response and the consumers’ two-period strategies. In
rder to obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we follow
he method of backwards induction. We ﬁrst solve the manufac-
urer’s second period problem and then solve the ﬁrst-period prob-
em. Let 1 and 2 denote the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-period and
econd-period proﬁts, respectively. 
.2.1. The manufacturer’s second-period problem 
The manufacturer’s second-period optimization problem can be
xpressed as 8 Obviously, when q OU = 0 in the second period (i.e., no secondary market exists), 
he TPE is necessarily a nonparticipant. This case, however, is not the focus of our 
esearch. 
i
nax p 2 2 (p 1 , p 2 , p 
∗
u ) = p 2 (q NN + q ON ) 
= p 2 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ + 
p 1 − p 2 
δ −α −
p 2 − p ∗u 
1 + α − δ
)
, 
(2)
here p 2 denotes the price of the new products in period 2, and
he TPE’s best response p ∗u is taken into account in the manufac-
urer’s decision. 
.2.2. The manufacturers ﬁrst-period problem 
In period 1, the manufacturer decides whether to introduce
n upgraded version of the new product in period 2. If he does
o, the upgrade occurs an investment cost. Suppose that the in-
estment cost function is 1 2 K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] , 9 where K represents
he manufacturer’s investment cost parameter, the manufacturer’s
rst-period optimization problem is 
ax p 1 (p 1 , p 
∗
2 , p 
∗
u ) = 1 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
= p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
− 1 
2 
K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] , (3) 
here the ﬁrst part is the manufacturer’s revenue in period 1, and
he second is his revenue in period 2, and the third is his invest-
ent cost when he releases an upgraded version in the second pe-
iod. The equilibrium decisions for the players are given in Table 1 ,
n which the threshold value represents the cost below which the
anufacturer will release an upgraded version, otherwise he will
etain the old version (for a detailed technical analysis, see the
ppendix A ). 
In the following, we will analyze the impact of parameters on
he equilibrium decisions. First, we look at how the price of used
roduct p u change with respect to the product durability, the re-
erse cost of used products and the new product upgrade degree.
e have the following proposition. 
roposition 1. The price of used products p u increases in product
urability δ and the reverse cost of used products c but is uni-
odal (ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing) in the new product upgrade
egree α. 
The role of product durability is two-fold. On the one hand,
igher durability expands the market segment that chooses to con-
inue using the product and shrinks the segment of consumers
ho decide to sell their used products and buy new ones in the
econd period. The result is a higher procurement cost for the
PE, which reduces product viability and thus product quantity. On
he other hand, increased product durability increases the demand9 Such increasing convex cost functions are common in the literature on investing 
n improvements (e.g., Esteban & Shum, 2007; Gurnani & Erkoc, 2008 ). Obviously, if 
o upgraded version is released, then no investment is required. 
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Wfor used products in the second period (see Remark 1 (2)). The
TPE can therefore charge consumers a higher price for used prod-
ucts in the secondary market. As the reverse cost of used products
increases (i.e., a higher residual value of used products for con-
sumers), more consumers prefer to continue using their original
products in period 2, making it more diﬃcult for the TPE to reverse
channel used products. As a result, the TPE charges a higher price
for the used products in the secondary market. The price of used
products is unimodal in the new product upgrade degree because
this degree has two effects on the used product price: First (effect
A), the higher the new product upgrade degree in the second pe-
riod, the higher the utilities of consumers who do not buy in the
ﬁrst period but buy a new product in the second period. Hence, a
higher upgrade degree makes the second-period new product more
competitive at the expense of the used product, meaning that its
price increases as the update degree increases. Conversely (effect
B), as the upgrade degree increases, the utilities that ﬁrst period
consumers obtain from selling their used products to the TPE and
buying a new one in the second period increase, so the TPE can
procure used products more cheaply, which has a positive effect
on the quantity of used products. As a result, the impact of new
product upgrade degree on the used product price depends on the
balance of the two effects. The used product price decreases with
the new product upgrade degree when the effect B is dominat-
ing, otherwise, the used product price increases with the upgrade
degree. 
Next, we analyze the properties of the manufacturer’s new
product price, which is presented in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. The optimal prices of the manufacturer’s new product
have the following properties: 
(1) The optimal prices of new products in both the ﬁrst and second
periods increase with the reverse cost of used products c; 
(2) The optimal price of new products in the ﬁrst period decreases
with the new product upgrade degree α; 
(3) The optimal price of new products in the second period is uni-
modal in the new product upgrade degree α. 
The property (1) is straightforward. Because the higher the re-
verse cost of used products, the higher the residual value of used
products (i.e., the higher the quality of new products in period 1),
the optimal price of new products in the ﬁrst period increases as
the reverse cost of used products increases. The manufacturer can
then charge consumers a higher price for new products in period
1. On the other hand, a higher price for new products in period 1
results in a lower sales volume for new products in period 1, lead-
ing to a lower reverse volume of used products for the TPE in pe-
riod 2. This reduction implies that in period 2, the TPE faces strong
competition from new products from which the manufacturer can
beneﬁt by charging consumers a higher price for new products. 
As the new product upgrade degree increases, both consumers
who buy a new product in period 1 sell it at the end of period
1, and buy a new product in period 2 and consumers who do not
buy in period 1 but buy a new product in period 2 enjoy an in-
crease in utilities. Therefore, the second-period new products can
become more competitive, meaning that the manufacturer always
has higher incentive to charge a lower price for new products in
period 1 in order to expand the new product market segment in
period 2. This effect is driven by two opposing forces. On the one
hand (effect C), a higher upgrade degree makes the second-period
new products more competitive, so the manufacturer can charge a
higher price for them in period 2; on the other (effect D), as the
upgrade degree increases, the TPE’s procurement cost decreases,
which has a positive effect on the quantity of used products. The
latter, however, also leads to greater cannibalization of new prod-
ucts, which lowers the new product price in period 2. When thepgrade degree is low, effect C dominates effect D and a higher
pgrade degree leads to an increase in second-period new product
rices. 
Now, we move to the TPE’s decision, and we have the following
roposition. 
roposition 3. 
(1) If the manufacturer releases an upgraded version in the second
period, there is a threshold value c , 
c = δ(δ−α)(1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)] 
4(1+ α) 2 (1+ δ−α)(7 δ−7 α+1)+ δ(δ−α)[(δ−α)(6 δ−27 α−27) −13(1+ α)] 
such that when 0 < c < c , the TPE will choose to enter the sec-
ondary market; otherwise, when c ≥ c , she will choose to with-
draw. 
(2) Because upgrading new products increases the range of the
TPE’s reverse costs (i.e., expands her survival space in the sec-
ondary market), the product upgrade in the second period ben-
eﬁts a TPE engaged in the secondary market. When upgrades
are major, however, no such beneﬁt accrues. 
This proposition shows that the TPE chooses to enter the sec-
ndary market when 0 < c < c because the optimal price of used
roducts is greater than her investment cost (i.e., p ∗u > c), which
akes it proﬁtable to sell used products. If c ≥ c , however, the op-
imal price of used products is less than or equal to the TPE’s in-
estment cost (i.e., p ∗u ≤ c), so her engagement in the secondary
arket is not proﬁtable, which implies that the manufacturer can
eaken his secondary market by improving the procurement cost
f used products. For example, Cisco requires each buyer of its re-
urbished equipment to pay high relicensing fees for the propri-
tary software that runs on the equipment. This practice, in ef-
ect, creates a higher procurement cost for the TPE and eliminates
he secondary market ( Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) . Likewise, Sun
icrosystems, an IT server business, has deliberately attempted
o eliminate the secondary market for its machines worldwide
hrough its pricing and licensing schemes ( Marion, 2004 ). 
Based on the proof given in the Appendix C , we can see that
s the upgrade degree increases, the threshold value of the TPE’s
everse cost ﬁrst increases and then decreases. We depict the in-
uition underlying Proposition 3 (2) in Fig. 3 (i.e., δ = 0 . 9 ), which
isplays the range of the TPEs reverse cost. 
Here, a lower upgrade degree implies no signiﬁcant difference
etween the upgraded and original versions, meaning that more
onsumers who buy a new product in the ﬁrst period prefer to
ontinue using it in the second period. This preference in turn
eads to an increase in the TPE’s reverse cost of used products.
owever, as the upgrade degree increases, more consumers who
uy a new product in the ﬁrst period prefer to sell their used prod-
ct to the TPE at the end of period 1 and buy a new product in
eriod 2, thereby reducing the TPE’s procurement cost. Moreover,
hen the upgrade degree is greater than a certain value, manufac-
urer’s upgrading of new products does not beneﬁt a TPE in the
econdary market except in industries where upgrades are typi-
ally minor or moderate (in which case, upgrading expands her
urvival space). 
.2.3. The manufacturer’s product upgrade problem 
Whether a manufacturer decides to release an upgraded new
roduct in period 2 depends on whether doing so is more prof-
table than continuing to sell the original version product; that is,
(p ∗1 | α> 0 ) > (p ∗1 | α=0 ) . We thus compare total two-period prof-
ts in two cases: (1) the manufacturer releases an original version
n the ﬁrst period but an upgraded version in the second period
nd (2) the manufacturer sells the original version in both periods.
e draw the following conclusion: 
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Fig. 3. Changing trends in reverse costs. 
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0  roposition 4. For the monopolistic manufacturer, there exists a
hreshold value for manufacturer’s investment cost parameter K
enoted as K ∗( α) 
 
∗(α) = 2[ (p 
∗
1 | α> 0 ) − (p ∗1 | α> 0 )] 
α(α + 2) , 
 = p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + p 2 (q NN + q ON ) , 
(p ∗1 | α> 0 ) equals to (p ∗1 | α=0 ) , when α = 0 . 
uch that if K < K ∗( α), the manufacturer will release an upgraded
ersion product in period 2, but if K ≥ K ∗( α), he will keep selling the
riginal version. 
Proposition 4 suggests that the manufacturer should use two
ifferent introduction strategies depending on the investment cost
arameter of upgrading new products. When the investment cost
arameter is small ( K < K ∗( α)), the manufacturer should release an
pgraded version in the second period because a higher upgrade
egree increases the competitiveness of second-period new prod-
cts, a beneﬁt that outweighs the potentially negative cannibaliza-
ion effect of used products. When the investment cost parameter
s large ( K ≥ K ∗( α)), however, the manufacturer should continue
elling the original version in the second period. 
We then let δ = 0 . 9 , c = 0 . 005 and numerically illustrate the
hange of threshold values of the manufacturers investment cost in
pgrade degree(see Fig. 4 ). Fig. 4 shows a marked decrease of the
hreshold value in the upgrade degree α. This observation implies
hat although the manufacturer may prefer to release an upgraded
roduct in period 2, the decrease in the threshold value of invest-
ent cost parameters limits his upgrade ability and makes up-
rading extremely diﬃcult when the upgrade degree is very large.
ence, the manufacturer must ﬁnd a balance between the upgrade
egree and investment cost. 
Having identiﬁed the optimal strategies for the manufacturer
nd TPE with new product upgrade, we now gauge the extent to
hich upgrading impacts the proﬁtability of both the manufacturer
nd TPE. The highly nonlinear equations make analytical compar-
son diﬃcult. We, therefore, illustrate the impact of upgrading on
roﬁts in a series of detailed numerical examples. 
Using the same parameters as in the previous examples
 δ = 0 . 9 , c = 0 . 005 ) and let K = 0 . 005 (we also explored otherarameter combinations in their domains, and got similar results),
e plot the changing of manufacturer’s proﬁt with the increasing
f upgrade degree, which is presented in Fig. 5 . From Fig. 5 , we
ave the following observation. 
bservation 1. When an upgraded product is released in the sec-
nd period, the manufacturer’s proﬁt ﬁrst increases and then de-
reases in the new product upgrade degree α. 
According to Proposition 4 , if the investment cost is feasible
or the manufacturer, he prefers to release an upgraded product in
he second period. Here, ( α > 0) represents the total two-period
roﬁt of the manufacturer who introduces an upgraded product in
eriod 2, while (α = 0) represents that of the manufacturer who
ells the same version during both periods. It is apparent from the
gure that the manufacturers proﬁt from releasing an upgraded
roduct in period 2 is greater than his proﬁt from selling the orig-
nal version when α ∈ (0, 0.763). Furthermore, this proﬁt ﬁrst in-
reases and then decreases in the upgrade degree. This effect of
he upgrade degree on the manufacturers total two-period proﬁt is
 result of two phenomena: On the one hand (effect E), the higher
he new product upgrade degree in period 2, the higher the utili-
ies of those consumers who buy a new product in period 1 then
ell their used product and buy a new product in period 2, as well
s of those who do not buy in the ﬁrst period but buy a new prod-
ct in the second period. These choices result in a higher sales vol-
me for the second-period new product, which increases the man-
facturer’s proﬁt. On the other hand (effect F), as α increases, the
tilities that the ﬁrst-period consumers obtain from selling their
sed products to the TPE and buying a new one in the second
eriod also increase, which lowers the TPE’s procurement cost for
sed products. In other words, the sales of used products in the
econd-period market increase. Nevertheless, because used prod-
cts cannibalize new products in period 2, the competition from
sed products becomes stronger, which has a negative effect on
he manufacturer’s proﬁts. Thus, when the value is low, effect E
ominates effect F and the manufacturers proﬁt increases in the
pgrade degree, but when value is high, his proﬁt decreases. 
Again using the same parameters as in previous examples ( δ =
 . 9 , c = 0 . 005 , K = 0 . 005 ), we plot the changing of TPE’s proﬁts as
450 Y. Xiong et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 252 (2016) 443–454 
Fig. 4. Threshold values of the manufacturers investment cost. 
Fig. 5. Manufacturers proﬁts. 
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when it is major ( α ≥ 0.769)). the upgrade degree increases, which is depicted in Fig. 6 . From
Fig. 6 , we have the following observation. 
Observation 2. The manufacturer’s release of an upgraded prod-
uct in the second period beneﬁts a TPE in the secondary market,
whose proﬁt ﬁrst increases and then decreases in the new product
upgrade degree. 
Here, e represents the TPE’s proﬁt when the manufacturer
releases an upgraded product in period 2. As in the analysis of
manufacturer proﬁt, we ﬁnd that the TPE’s proﬁt ﬁrst increases
( α ∈ (0, 0.331)) and then decreases ( α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) as the up-rade degree increases. This effect is also driven by two opposing
orces. On the one hand (effect G), as α increases, the sales of used
roducts in the second period increase, which leads to an increase
n the TPE’s proﬁt. On the other hand (effect H), a higher α makes
econd-period new products more competitive at the expense of
sed products, so the TPE’s proﬁt decreases in the upgrade degree.
hen effect G dominates effect H, the TPE’s proﬁt increases, oth-
rwise, it decreases. Once again, the manufacturer’s second-period
pgrading of new products beneﬁts the TPE when the upgrade is
inor ( α ∈ (0, 0.331)) or moderate ( α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) but not
Y. Xiong et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 252 (2016) 443–454 451 
Fig. 6. TPE proﬁts. 
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L. Conclusion 
Although the durable product literature has long studied the ef-
ect of secondary markets on manufacturers strategies in the pri-
ary market, most research assumes either the secondary market
s a perfect market or used products are sold outside the stan-
ard channel. 10 It thus ignores the effect of introducing upgraded
ew products on the TPE’s entrance decision to secondary market.
e, in contrast, examine how a manufacturers upgrade strategies
n the durable goods market affect the TPE’s entrance decision to
econdary market. We consider several factors simultaneously in
ur model: an active secondary market, upgrading of new prod-
cts, consumer market segmentation, and most especially, the up-
rade degree of new products as a function of consumer demand. 
To focus on the effect of introducing upgraded new products on
he secondary market, we developed a dynamic two-period model
n which a monopolistic manufacturer sells his new durable prod-
cts directly to end consumers in both periods, while in the second
eriod, a TPE sells reverse channeled used products in a secondary
arket not directly controlled by the manufacturer. We derive the
ondition under which manufacturer’s upgrading beneﬁts a TPE.
e also identify an investment cost threshold below which the
anufacturer’s optimal strategy is to release an upgraded version
roduct in the second period. We generate managerial insights into
ow manufacturer upgrading of new products impact the decision
f the TPE in the secondary market by characterizing the opti-
al strategies of both parties. We ﬁnd that manufacturer’s upgrad-
ng of new products can increase a third-party entrant’s proﬁtabil-
ty in a secondary market when upgrades are typically small or
oderate. It does not, however, beneﬁt the TPE engaged in selling
sed products when upgrades are typically large. 
The ﬁndings reported here suggest two obvious possibilities for
urther research. First, our model could be extended to a recov-
ry market, a typical assumption in the durable product literature,10 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) ; Levinthal and Purohit (1989) ; Zhao and Jagpal 
2006) . 
ahich would raise such additional issues as how different recov-
ry channels of used products affect the strategies of the man-
facturers product upgrade. Likewise, extending the model to an
ligopoly market would raise new and interesting questions; es-
ecially, whether and how a ﬁrm should discriminate between its
wn former customers and those of its rivals. 
cknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to the associate editor and two anony-
ous referees for their helpful suggestions and valuable com-
ents. This research has been funded by the National Natural Sci-
nce Foundation of China (71301178,71271225), and Chongqing’s
atural Science Foundation (cstc2012jjA1404). 
ppendix A. Equilibrium decisions for the channel partners in 
odel 
The TPE’s optimization problem is 
ax p u e (p 1 , p 2 , p u ) = p u q OU − cq NN 
= p u 
(
p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ −
p u 
δ
)
− c 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ
)
, 
s.t., 0 < q OU ≤ q NN (A.1) 
here all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in the
aper. Substituting these segment sizes into the TPE’s objective
unction, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p u e 
∂ p 2 u 
< 0 . Therefore, the proﬁt function
f the TPE is concave in p u . The Lagrangian for the TPE’s problem
s 
 e (p u , λ1 ) = p u 
(
p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ −
p u 
δ
)
− c 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ
)
+ λ1 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ −
p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ + 
p u 
δ
)
nd the Kuhn–Tucker conditions for optimality are: 
∂L e (p u , λ1 ) 
∂ p u 
= p u 
( −1 
1 + α − δ −
1 
δ
)
+ p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ −
p u 
δ
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T
+
−+ λ1 
(
1 
1 + α − δ + 
1 
δ
)
= 0 ;
λ1 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ −
p 2 − p u 
1 + α − δ + 
p u 
δ
)
= 0 ;
0 < q OU ≤ q NN . 
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrangean
multiplier λ1 is greater than or equates to zero. 
Case TPE-a: λ1 = 0 . Simultaneously solving for the above equa-
tions, we have that p ∗u = δp 2 2(1+ α) . Meanwhile, the constraint 0 < q OU 
≤ q NN leads to 0 < p 2 ≤ 2(1+ α+ c−δ) 3 . Therefore, the TPE will choose
p ∗u = δp 2 2(1+ α) , when 0 < p 2 ≤
2(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3 . 
Case TPE-b: λ1 > 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equa-
tions, we have that p ∗u = δ(2 p 2 + δ−c−1 −α) 1+ α , λ1 = 
δ(3 p 2 +2 δ−2 c−2 −2 α) 
1+ α . In
addition the Lagrangian multiplier λ1 > 0 leads to p 2 > 
2(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3 
Meanwhile, from the utility function, we know that p 2 < 1 + α +
c − δ. Therefore, we obtain 2(1+ α+ c−δ) 3 < p 2 < 1 + α + c − δ. 
We now consider the price of new products in the second pe-
riod under the Case TPE-a. Note that we denote this case in Case
M2-a. Replacing the values p ∗u = δp 2 2(1+ α) and the constraint 0 < p 2 ≤
2(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3 of the Case TPE-a, we obtain the manufacturer’s second
period problem is 
Max p 2 2 (p 1 , p 2 , p 
∗
u ) = p 2 (q NN + q ON ) 
= p 2 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ + 
p 1 − p 2 
δ −α −
p 2 − p ∗u 
1 + α − δ
)
s.t., 0 < p 2 < 
2(1 + α + c − δ) 
3 
, (A.2)
where all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in the
paper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s
second-period problem, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p 2 2 
∂ p 2 
2 
< 0 . Therefore,
the proﬁt function of the manufacturer’s second-period is con-
cave in p 2 . The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s second-period
problem is 
L e (p u , λ1 ) = p 2 (q NN + q ON ) 
= p 2 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ + 
p 1 − p 2 
δ − α −
p 2 − p ∗u 
1 + α − δ
)
− λ2 
(
p 2 − 2(1 + α + c − δ) 
3 
)
and the Kuhn–Tucker conditions for optimality are: 
∂L 2 (p 2 , λ2 ) 
∂ p 2 
= 1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ + 
p 1 − p 2 
δ − α −
p 2 [2(1 + α) − δ] 
2(1 + α)(1 + α − δ) 
+ p 2 
[ 
− 1 
1 + α − δ −
1 
δ − α
− 2(1 + α) − δ
2(1 + α)(1 + α − δ) 
]
− λ2 = 0 ;
λ2 
(
p 2 − 2(1 + α + c − δ) 
3 
)
= 0 ;
0 < p 2 < 
2(1 + α − c − δ) 
3 
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrange
multiplier λ2 is greater than or equals to zero. 
Case M2-a-1: λ2 = 0 . Simultaneously solving for the above equa-
tions, we have that p ∗
2 
= (1+ α)[(δ−α)(1+ α+ c−δ)+ p 1 (1+ α−δ)] 
2(1+ α)+(δ−α)[2(1+ α) −δ] . In addi-
tion, the constraint 0 < p 2 < 
2(1+ α−c−δ) 
3 of the manufacturer’s sec-
ond period problem leads to 0 < p 1 < 
(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3(1+ α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1 −
2 δ
1+ α )] . ase M2-a-2: λ2 > 0. Solving the sys-
em, we have that p ∗2 = 2(1+ α+ c−δ) 3 and λ2 =
[2(δ−α) δ−(1+ α)(4+ δ−α)](1+ α−δ+ c)+3 p 1 (1+ α)(1+ α−δ) 
3(1+ α)(δ−α)(1+ α−δ) . Moreover, Lagrange
ultiplier λ2 > 0 leads to p 1 > 
(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3(1+ α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ1+ α )] . 
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the second
eriod under the Case TPE-b. Note that we denote this case in Case
2-b. Replacing the values p ∗u = δ(2 p 2 + δ−c−1 −α) 1+ α and the constraint
f the case TPE-b, we obtain that the manufacturer’s second period
roblem is 
ax p 2 2 (p 1 , p 2 , p 
∗
u ) = p 2 (q NN + q ON ) 
= p 2 
(
1 − p 2 − c 
1 + α − δ + 
p 1 − p 2 
δ −α −
p 2 − p ∗u 
1 + α − δ
)
s.t., 
2(1 + α + c − δ) 
3 
< p 2 < 1 + α + c − δ. 
(A.3)
here all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in
he paper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manu-
acturer’s second-period problem, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p 2 2 
∂ p 2 
2 
< 0 .
herefore, the proﬁt function of the manufacturer’s sec-
nd period is concave in p 2 . Solving the ﬁrst derivative of
he problem, we have p ∗
2 
= (1+ α)(δ−α)(1+ α+ c−δ)+ p 1 (1+ α−δ) 
2(1+ α−δ)(1+2 δ−α) .
n addition, the constraint 2(1+ α+ c−δ) 3 < p 2 < 1 + α + c − δ
eads to (1+ α+ c−δ)[(1+ α)(4+5 δ−α) −4 δ(1+2 δ−α)] 
3(1+ α)(1+ α−δ) < p 1 < (1 + α + c −
) [(1+ α)(2+3 δ−α) −2 δ(1+2 δ−α)] 
(1+ α)(1+ α−δ) . 
Now we consider the price of new products in the ﬁrst period
nder the Case M2-a-1. Note that we denote this case as Case M1-
-1. Replacing the values p ∗
2 
= (1+ α)[(δ−α)(1+ α+ c−δ)+ p 1 (1+ α−δ)] 
2(1+ α)+(δ−α)[2(1+ α) −δ] and
he constraint in Case M2-a-1, we obtain that the manufacturer’s
rst period problem is 
ax p 1 (p 1 , p 
∗
2 , p 
∗
u ) = 1 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
= p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
− 1 
2 
K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] , 
s.t., 0 < p 1 < 
(1 + α + c − δ) 
3(1 + α − δ) 
×
[
4 + (δ − α) 
(
1 − 2 δ
1 + α
)]
. (A.4)
here all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in the
aper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s
rst-period problem, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p 1 1 
∂ p 2 
1 
< 0 . Therefore, the
roﬁt function is concave in p 1 . 
The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-period problem is 
 1 (p 1 , λ3 ) = p 1 
(
1 − p 1 − p 
∗
2 
δ − α + p 
∗
2 
(
1 − p 
∗
2 − c 
1 + α − δ
)
+ p 1 − p 
∗
2 
δ − α −
p ∗2 − p ∗u 
1 + α − δ
)
−1 
2 
K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] − λ3 
(
p 1 − (1 + α + c − δ) 
3(1 + α − δ) 
×
[
4 + (δ − α) 
(
1 − 2 δ
1 + α
)])
(A.5)
he Kuhn–Tucker conditions for optimality are: 
∂L 1 (p 1 , λ3 ) 
∂ p 1 
= 1 − 2 p 1 
δ − α
 
2(1 + α)[(δ − α)(1 + α − δ) + c(δ − α) + p 1 (1 + α − δ)] + p 1 (1 + α)(1 + α − δ) 
(δ − α)[2(1 + α)(1 + α − δ) − δ(δ − α)] 
λ3 = 0 ;
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(
p 1 − (1 + α + c − δ) 
3(1 + α − δ) 
[
4 + (δ − α) 
(
1 − 2 δ
1 + α
)])
= 0 ;
 < p 1 < 
(1 + α + c − δ) 
3(1 + α − δ) 
[
4 + (δ − α) 
(
1 − 2 δ
1 + α
)]
. 
We consider two sub-cases according to whether the La-
rangian multiplier λ3 is greater than or equals to zero. 
ase M1-a-1: λ3 = 0 . Simultaneously solving for the above equa-
ions, we have that p ∗
1 
= (δ−α)[2(1+ α)(2+ c) −δ(δ−α)] 
7(1+ α)(δ−α)+(1+ α) −2 δ(δ−α) . Moreover, p 
∗
1 
uch that the constraint 0 < p 1 < 
(1+ α+ c−δ) 
3(1+ α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ1+ α )] . 
ase M1-a-2: λ3 > 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equa-
ions, we have that p 1 = (1+ α+ c−δ) 3(1+ α−δ) [4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ1+ α )] and
3 = 1 − 2(1 + α + c − δ)(4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ/ (1 + α))) / (3 + 3 α −
 − δ) / (δ − α) + ((2 + 2 α)((δ − α)(1 + α − δ) + c(δ − α) + (1 + 
+ c − δ)(4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ/ (1 + α))) / (3 + 3 α − 3 − δ)(1 + α −
)) + (1 + α)(1 + α − δ)(4 + (δ − α)(1 − 2 δ/ (1 + α))) / (3 + 3 α −
 δ) / (2 + 2 α + (δ − α)(2 + 2 α − δ)) . 
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the ﬁrst pe-
iod under the Case M2-a-2. Note that we denote this case as Case
1-a-2. Replacing the values p ∗
2 
= 2(1+ α+ c−δ) 3 and the constraint
n Case M2-a-2, we obtain that the manufacturer’s ﬁrst period
roblem is 
ax p 1 (p 1 , p 
∗
2 , p 
∗
u ) = 1 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
= p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
−1 
2 
K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] , 
s.t., p 1 > 
(1 + α + c − δ) 
3(1 + α − δ) 
×
[
4 + (δ − α) 
(
1 − 2 δ
1 + α
)]
. (A.6) 
here all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in the
aper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s
rst-period problem, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p 1 1 
∂ p 2 
1 
< 0 . Therefore, the
roﬁt function is concave in p 1 . Solving the ﬁrst order deriva-
ive of the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-period problem, we have that p ∗
1 
=
4(1+ c)+ α−δ
6 . It can be shown that p 
∗
1 does not satisfy the constraint.
herefore, this case will never occur in equilibrium. 
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the ﬁrst pe-
iod Case M2-b. We denote this case as Case M1-b. Substituting
he value p ∗
2 
= (1+ α)[(δ−α)(1+ α+ c−δ)+ p 1 (1+ α−δ)] 
2(1+ α−δ)(1+2 δ−α) and the constraint in
ase M2-b, we obtain that the manufacturer’s ﬁrst period problem
s 
ax p 1 (p 1 , p 
∗
2 , p 
∗
u ) = 1 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) 
 p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + ∗2 (p 1 , p ∗2 , p ∗u ) −
1 
2 
K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] , 
.t., p 1 > 
(1 + α + c − δ)[(1 + α)(4 + 5 δ − α) − 4 δ(1 + 2 δ − α)] 
3(1 + α)(1 + α − δ) 
p 1 < (1 + α + c − δ) (1 + α)(2 + 3 δ − α) − 2 δ(1 + 2 δ − α) 
(1 + α)(1 + α − δ) . 
(A.7)
here all segment sizes have the functional form deﬁned in the
aper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer’s
rst-period problem, we ﬁnd that 
∂ 2 Max p 1 1 
∂ p 2 
1 
< 0 . Therefore, the
roﬁt function is concave in p 1 . Solving the ﬁrst order deriva-
ive of the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-period problem, we have that p ∗
1 
=
2(δ−α)(2+ δ+ c) 
1+8 δ−7 α . It can be shown that p 
∗
! does not satisfy the con-
traint. Based on the above analysis, we obtain the optimal pricef new products in period 1 is p ∗
1 
= (δ−α)[2(1+ α)(2+ c) −δ(δ−α)]) 
7(1+ α)(δ−α)+1+ α) −2 δ(δ−α) . Sub-
tituting p ∗
1 
into p ∗
2 
, p ∗u , we get 
p ∗2 = (1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)]+ c[(δ−α)(5 α−2 δ+2)+3(1+ α)] [(δ−α)(7 − 2 δ
1+ α )+1][2(1+ α)( 1 δ−α +1) −δ] 
p ∗u = δ(1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)]+ cδ[(δ−α)(5 α−2 δ+2)+3(1+ δ)] 2[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+1) −2 δ(δ−α)][2 δ(δ−α)][2(1+ α)( 1 
δ−α +1) −δ] 
. 
Therefore, the equilibrium decisions for the channel partners
re given in Table 1 . 
ppendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 
It is obvious that the price of used products increases
n the residual value c . For the sign of ∂ p u 
∂δ
, we have
∂ p u 
∂δ
= f 2 
∂ f 1 
∂δ
− f 1 
∂ f 2 
∂δ
4[(7 δ−7 α+1)(1+ α) −2 δ(δ−α)] 2 [2(1+ α)(1+ 1 
δ−α ) −δ] 2 
, where 
f 1 = δ(1 + α − δ)[(1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 5) − 3 δ(δ − α)] + cδ(5 δ −
 α + 7 αδ − 5 α2 − 2 δ2 + 3) , f 2 = 2[(1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 1) − 2 δ(δ −
)][2(1 + α)(1 + 1 
δ−α ) − δ] . Therefore, to show that 
∂ p u 
∂δ
> 0 , it is
uﬃcient to show that f 2 
∂ f 1 
∂δ
− f 1 ∂ f 2 ∂δ > 0 . Simple calculation can
ive the result. 
Finally 
∂ p u 
∂α
= f 2 
∂ f 1 
∂α
− f 1 ∂ f 2 ∂α
4[(7 δ − 7 α + 1)(1 + α) − 2 δ(δ − α)] 2 [2(1 + α)(1 + 1 
δ−α ) − δ] 2 
, 
hus, the sign of ∂ p u 
∂α
is determined by the sign of the numera-
or. Since f 2 
∂ f 1 
∂α
− f 1 ∂ f 2 ∂α = (δ((1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 5) − 3 δ(δ − α)) +
(1 + α − δ)(10 δ − 14 α − 2) + cδ(−2 + 7 δ − 10 α))((2 + 2 α)(7 δ −
 α + 1) − 4 δ(δ − α))((2 + 2 α)(1 + 1 / (δ − α)) − δ) − ((18 δ −
8 α − 12)((2 + 2 α)(1 + 1 / (δ − α)((1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 5) − 3 δ(δ −
)) + cδ(5 δ − 2 α + 7 αδ − 5 α2 − 2 δ2 + 3 and α < δ. Using exten-
ive numerical analysis by taking values in the whole domain, we
an show that f 2 
∂ f 1 
∂α
− f 1 ∂ f 2 ∂α is ﬁrst positive and then negative as
increases. Namely, the price of used products ﬁrst increases in
he upgraded degree, and then decreases in the upgraded degree. 
ppendix C. Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) This result is obvious. 
(ii) For the sign of 
∂ p ∗
1 
∂δ
, we have, 
∂ p ∗
1 
∂δ
= (−4 − 8 α − 2 c − 2 αδ −
4 α2 + 2 δ2 − 2 α2 δ + 2 αδ2 − 4 cα − 2 cα2 + 5 α2 δ2 − 10 αδ3 + 
8 cαδ2 − 4 cα2 δ + 5 δ4 − 4 cδ3 ) / (−7 δ + 6 α − 1 − 9 αδ + 7 α2 + 
2 δ2 )) 2 . Note that α < δ, so 
∂ p ∗
1 
∂δ
< 0 . 
(iii) Omitted, please refer to the proof of Proposition 1 (iii). 
ppendix D. Proof of Proposition 3 
To show that p ∗u − c > 0 , i.e., p ∗u − c =
δ(1+ α−δ)[(1+ α)(7 δ−7 α+5) −3 δ(δ−α)]+ cδ(5 δ−2 α+7 αδ−5 α2 −2 δ2 +3) 
2[(7 δ−7 α+1)(1+ α) −2 δ(δ−α)][2(1+ α)(1+ 1 
δ−α) −δ] 
− c > 0 , it 
s suﬃcient to show that δ(1 + α − δ)[(1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 5) −
 δ(δ − α)] + cδ(5 δ − 2 α + 7 αδ − 5 α2 − 2 δ2 + 3) − 2 c[(7 δ − 7 α + 
)(1 + α) − 2 δ(δ − α)][2(1 + α)(1 + 1 
δ−α) − δ] > 0 . That is, c[[14
(δ − α)(1 + α) + 2(1 + α) − 4 δ(δ − α)][2 1+ α
δ−α + 2(1 + α) − δ] −
(5 δ − 2 α + 7 αδ − 5 α2 − 2 δ2 + 3)] < δ(1 + α − δ)[(1 + α)(7 δ −
 α + 5) − 3 δ(δ − α)] . 
Thus, 
 < 
δ(δ − α)(1 + α − δ)[(1 + α)(7 δ − 7 α + 5) − 3 δ(δ − α)] 
4(1 + α) 2 (1 + δ − α)(7 δ − 7 α + 1) + δ(δ − α)[(δ − α)(6 δ − 27 α − 27) − 13(1 + α)] . 
ppendix E. Proof of Proposition 4 
If the manufacturer decides to release a new upgraded prod-
ct in period 2, the proﬁt of releasing a new upgraded prod-
ct must larger than the proﬁt of selling the original ver-
ion products in period 2, i.e., (p ∗ | α > 0) > (p ∗ | α = 0) . On
1 1 
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 the other hand, from the function of manufacturer’s optimiza-
tion problem, it is clear that the proﬁt of the manufacturer
( p 1 ) decreases linearly in K . Therefore, in order to obtain the
threshold value K ∗( α), we need to let (p ∗
1 
| α > 0) = (p ∗
1 
|
α = 0) . That is, (p ∗
1 
| α > 0) − 1 2 K[(1 + α) 2 − 1] = (p ∗1 | α = 0) ,
where  = p 1 (q NN + q NU ) + p 2 (q NN + q ON ) . Thus, the threshold
value K ∗(α) = 2[ (p 
∗
1 
| α> 0) −(p ∗
1 
| α=0)] 
α(α+2) , and (p 
∗
1 | α > 0) = G (1 −
GN+(1+ α) H 
N(δ−α) ) + 
(1+ α) H 2 
2 N(1+ α−δ)(α−δ) ; 
G = (δ − α)(4 + 4 α + αδ + 2 cα − δ
2 + 2 c) 
1 + 7 δ + 9 αδ − 7 α2 − 2 δ2 − 6 α . 
N = 2 + 2 δ + 3 αδ − 2 α2 − δ2 ;
H = α2 − G (1 + α − δ) + cα − 2 αδ − δ + δ2 − cδ;
and, (p ∗1 | α > 0) equals to (p ∗1 | α = 0) , when α = 0 . 
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